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Low Decision Space Means No Decentralization in Fiji
Comment on “Decentralisation of Health Services in Fiji: A Decision Space Analysis”
Jean-Paul Faguet*
Abstract
Mohammed, North, and Ashton find that decentralization in Fiji shifted health-sector workloads from tertiary 
hospitals to peripheral health centres, but with little transfer of administrative authority from the centre. Decision-
making in five functional areas analysed remains highly centralized. They surmise that the benefits of decentralization 
in terms of services and outcomes will be limited. This paper invokes Faguet’s (2012) model of local government 
responsiveness and accountability to explain why this is so – not only for Fiji, but in any country that decentralizes 
workloads but not the decision space of local governments. A competitive dynamic between economic and civic actors 
that interact to generate an open, competitive politics, which in turn produces accountable, responsive government 
can only occur where real power and resources have been devolved to local governments. Where local decision space 
is lacking, by contrast, decentralization is bound to fail because it has not really happened in the first place.
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Introduction
This interesting paper examines two periods of the 
decentralization of healthcare in Fiji, and an intervening 
recentralization in between. It focuses particularly on the 
period 2008-2014, comprising the second wave of reform, and 
asks the question, to what extent were different health functions 
actually decentralized? The paper employs the ‘Decision 
Space’ approach pioneered by Bossert,1 which defines decision 
space as the local discretion allowed by central government 
for functions and sub-functions about financing, service 
delivery, human resources, and governance exercised by local 
governments. Carefully operationalized for empirical analysis, 
measures of decision space allow researchers to investigate 
the extent to which local authorities have policy discretion, 
or central authorities effectively circumscribe local choice 
through rules and incentives that promote central objectives.
Developing these ideas further, Bossert2 argues that the decision 
space approach has several advantages. It puts the focus 
squarely on the extent to which authority over public choices 
is shifted from central to local authorities. And it stresses that 
the choices in question are neither simple not monolithic, but 
rather involve a range of discretion over different functions 
and types of decisions. Therefore, we should expect a given 
decentralization reform to permit more local choice over 
budgets and financing in some areas (eg, primary education), 
and hiring and firing in others (eg, public infrastructure). This 
is a more realistic way of analysing the complexity of real-
world experience than the simple decentralized-centralized 
dichotomies that dominate the literature, concealing more 
than they reveal. In all these ways, ‘decision space’ is similar 
to the concept of ‘residual authority’ developed in Faguet.3 
The empirical operationalizations of decision space, however, 
constitute an important and original empirical dimension.
The paper finds that although workloads have shifted from 
tertiary hospitals to peripheral health centres, there has been 
little transfer of administrative authority from the centre. 
Decision-making in five functional areas analysed remains 
highly centralized. Hence – and this in my view is the most 
important point – the benefits of decentralization for citizens 
in terms of service provision and real outcomes are likely to 
be quite limited. The authors rightly stress, however, that the 
question of real health outcomes is beyond their remit.
Mohammed, North, and Ashton4 end their analysis there. The 
objective of this comment is to push the analysis further. I 
wish to provide theoretical underpinnings for their final, most 
powerful conclusion – given more as a speculation – and so 
show why it is likely true not only for Fiji, but indeed for any 
country that decentralises in a similar fashion.
Why would decentralization improve government 
responsiveness to citizen needs in the first place? How, 
additionally, might it make public services more efficient? 
The most important thing to understand is that citizen needs, 
unit costs, and the feasibility of realistic options vary across 
space. In any field of public policy, different places simply need 
different things, and have different realistic options available 
to them. What advantages might local governments have been 
over central government in such a context?
In comparison to central government, local government is said 
to benefit from: (i) more and/or better information regarding 
local preferences and conditions; (ii) louder citizen voice and 
participation in the government process; and (iii) superior 
accountability, and, hence, responsiveness of public servants to 
citizens. All of these effects, it is claimed, come about as a result 
of the creation of functionally independent local governments 
that are physically closer to their electorates (than central 
government), and whose political fortunes are in the hands of 
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those who benefit – or suffer – from the local services they 
provide. If “bringing government closer to the people” leads to 
improved information, voice, participation and accountability 
in public decision-making, then local public services should 
improve as a result. Services can improve in two broad ways: 
(a) lower costs through greater productive efficiency and 
less corruption; and (b) higher quality, interpreted to include 
services better-suited to local needs and conditions. Improved 
services, in turn, should lead to more intensive use by local 
citizens, and thence to better substantive outcomes. Examples 
of better substantive outcomes include lower infant mortality 
rates or higher rates of vaccination.
In practice, will decentralised governments benefit from better 
information, greater citizen voice, and superior accountability? 
Or will they be crippled by corruption, elite capture, and low 
capacity? Literally thousands of studies have attempted to 
answer this question, with results so mixed that the debate has 
rumbled on, increasingly fruitlessly, for decades (Faguet and 
Pöschl 2015; Channa and Faguet Forthcoming).5,6 An entire 
literature has marched into this dead-end, failing to realize that 
the basic question it posits is misconstrued.3 The simplest way 
to explain it is as follows: The question, “Does decentralization 
improve service delivery?” has two obvious answers:
(1)	 Yes. Of course services will improve. In at least some 
localities, resources will be spent and decisions taken 
in such a way that education, health, and other services 
improve compared to what central government provided.
(2)	 No. Of course services will worsen. In at least some other 
localities, resources will be spent and decisions taken 
in such a way that education, health, and other services 
worsen compared to what central government did before.
In a third set of localities, which in many countries may be 
the majority, services will continue much as before, neither 
significantly better nor worse, and decentralization will 
have little effect. This is true not by assumption, but by the 
very definition of decentralization, which even in relatively 
homogeneous countries should lead to a greater diversity 
of outcomes, in both type and efficiency. The “outputs” of 
decentralization are, thus, the simple aggregation of all of 
the local outputs that reform produces. Each of these local 
outcomes is, in turn, driven by interactions of the underlying 
actors and characteristics of each place. The necessary 
implication is that for much of the past four decades, 
researchers have been asking the wrong sorts of questions, 
of a type: ‘Is decentralization good or bad for policy variable 
X?’ A far better approach is to admit from the outset that 
decentralization leads to a broad heterogeneity of response, 
and ask: ‘Why are the good outcomes good, and why are the bad 
outcomes bad?’ To understand the effects of decentralization 
on any political and administrative system, we must begin our 
analysis at the grass roots. To understand decentralization, we 
must first understand how local government works.
A Theory of (Local) Government Responsiveness
Why do some local governments provide better services, 
and others worse ones? Consider Faguet’s model3,7 of local 
governance depicted in the Figure. Our goal is to understand 
the determinants of responsiveness and accountability in 
local governance.[1] As the figure implies, the first-order 
determinant of a responsive, accountable government is an 
open, substantively competitive politics. Where politics is 
open to new entrants and focuses on issues of substance, as 
opposed to appearance, political competition will produce 
a strong inclusive tendency in the sense of not leaving 
significant groups of voters unrepresented. Political platforms 
will tend to focus on the real needs of voters and firms, 
rather than descending into beauty contests. Hence, the best 
predictor of governments that are accountable and responsive 
is open political systems where competition is substantive and 
political entrepreneurialism[2] possible.
But open, competitive politics is not a fixed municipal 
characteristic. Rather, it emerges endogenously through the 
interaction of local economic interests and civic organizations. 
Where the firms and other economic interests that comprise 
the local economy are diverse and heterogeneous, and where 
civil society is organized into many, active groups, and where 
these two sets of actors interact with one another through 
local politics, proposing needs, debating competing priorities, 
and searching for avenues of mutual benefit, local politics will 
tend strongly towards openness and competition as described 
above.
Where, by contrast, the local economy is dominated by a 
single large actor, the diversity of political forms that supports 
broad representation will tend not to emerge. And where civil 
society is atomized into individuals, and the intermediating 
organizations that aggregate preferences and organize collective 
action are missing, politics will tend to become divorced from 
society’s needs.8 In either case, politics will tend to be less open 
and less competitive, or competitive in dimensions orthogonal 
to the needs of voters and the economy. As the figure also 
implies, economic interests and civic organizations are capable 
of exerting direct effects on responsiveness and accountability 
too. But evidence suggests that these effects are weak, and 
hence firms’ and civic organizations’ primary channel of 
influence is through the political system.
Conclusion
The crucial underlying assumption necessary for this system 
to work is that real power and resources lie in the hands of local 
authorities. In other words, substantive decentralization has 
occurred, leaving elected local officials with enough decision 
space to make the costly competition for power and influence 
that civic organizations and firms are presumed to engage in 
worthwhile. If local officials instead have little decision space, 
Figure. A Theory of (Local) Government Responsiveness. Reproduced 
from Faguet,3 with permission from the University of Michigan Press.
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implying that power and discretion continue to reside in the 
centre, then neither firms nor citizen groups will have much 
incentive to support local parties, lobby officials, or otherwise 
compete for power. Where public services are concerned, the 
relevant power will continue to lie in the capital, far beyond the 
reach of the vast majority of local actors. In such contexts, the 
requirements of responsive local governments cannot be met, 
and so the benefits of decentralization cannot be obtained.
This is why the question posed by Mohammed, North, and 
Ashton is so important. The first step to understanding the 
effects of any decentralization is to ask Did it really happen? 
In Fiji, it appears, the answer is no. This is both an important 




Author declares that he has no competing interests.
Author’s contribution 
JPF is the single author of the paper.
Endnotes
[1] As opposed to understanding how much power or resources are 
decentralized, or other systemic aspects of reform that require national-level 
analysis.
[2] Political entrepreneurialism can be defined as the identification, by a new 
politician or party, of a bloc of voters ill-served by existing political competition. 
When she then develops proposals and messages attuned to this bloc’s 
needs, and wins their votes in the following election, she is acting as a political 
entrepreneur.3
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